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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Shaula Marie George asserts that the State has failed to demonstrate error in the district
court’s order granting her motion to dismiss.  The district court held a hearing during which
evidence  was  admitted  establishing  that,  in  nearly  every  regard,  Ms.  George  is  treated  like  an
Indian,1 through her schooling, her religion, and by her participation in descendant-only tribal
benefits.   While  Ms.  George  is  3%  short  of  being  able  to  enroll  as  a  member  of  the  Coeur
d’Alene Tribe, the only benefit she does not receive from the Tribe is royalties from Casino
profits.  As such, the district court did not err when it found Ms. George is an Indian arrested for
conduct occurring on a reservation, and therefore the State does not have jurisdiction over
Ms. George.
The district court properly dismissed Ms. George’s case, finding it was a case within the
jurisdiction of the Coeur d’Alene Tribe, because Ms. George was an Indian.  The State appealed.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
At approximately six o’clock in the afternoon on September 6, 2016, Shaula George
spoke to a tribal police officer at her home in Worley, Idaho.  (R., p.8.)  Ms. George’s home was
searched  pursuant  to  a  request  by  her  probation  officer.   (R.,  p.10.)   A  small  amount  of
methamphetamine, two Oxycodone pills, a small amount of heroin, and several pipes were found
at her home.  (R., p.11.)  The items were found in a bedroom Ms. George shared with Armando
1 The term “Indian” is a legal term, and its meaning within federal law such as the Major Crimes
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153, is at issue in this case.  Although the term “Native American” or
“American Indian” may be preferable, Ms. George will necessarily use “Indian” throughout her
Respondent’s Brief as that term is employed in the statutes at issue in this appeal.
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Garcia.2  (R., pp. 10-11.)  Ms. George was charged with two misdemeanors under Coeur d’Alene
Tribal Code for possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia.
(R., p.8.)  She was issued a tribal citation and booked on the charges.  (R., p.8.)  Upon learning
that  Ms.  George  was  not  an  enrolled  member  of  the  Coeur  d’Alene  Tribe,  the  arresting  tribal
officer attempted to change the court of jurisdiction to Idaho State court.  (R., p.8.)
Based on these facts, Ms. George was charged with violating Idaho State law for one
count of possession of Oxycodone, one count of possession of methamphetamine, one count of
possession of heroin, and one count of misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia.
(R., pp.52-54.)
Ms. George filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction because she is an Indian, and
the home where the incident allegedly occurred is on “Indian land.”  (R., pp.57-62.)  Ms. George
asserted that, when Congress amended the Indian Civil Rights Act in 1990 in response to the
United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990), it provided
criminal jurisdiction for all Indians in Indian Country, not simply member Indians.  (R., p.61.)
Ms. George provided documentation showing that she is a descendent of an enrolled member in
the Coeur d’Alene Tribe, her mother, Jean Marie Moffitt.  (R., p.63.)  A Letter of Descendency
from the Enrollment Department of the Coeur d’Alene Tribe was attached to Ms. George’s
motion to dismiss.  (R., p.63.)
A hearing was held and both Ms. George and her mother, Aileen George, testified
regarding Ms. George’s lineage and tribal involvement.  (See generally, Tr.,)
At  the  hearing  on  Ms.  George’s  motion  to  dismiss,  the  court  took  the  matter  under
advisement  but  told  the  parties,  “I  do  find  that  –  and  I’m  not  making  a  finding,  so  don’t
2 Mr. Garcia was also charged with possessing the methamphetamine and the pipe.  (R., p.11.)
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misconstrue my language here, but I find it very nearly offensive to say that Miss George is not
an Indian.”  (Tr., p.53, Ls.21-24.)
In ruling on Ms. George’s motion, the district court made the following findings of fact:
Ms. George is a 24-year-old American Indian.  Ms. George’s biological mother,
Jean Moffitt, has 14/32nds combined Coeur d’Alene, Spokane, and Colville
blood,  or  is  44%  Indian.   The  Letter  of  Descendency  for  Shaula  Marie  Moffitt
(aka  Shaula  Marie  George)  from  the  Coeur  d’Alene  Tribe  declares  that
Ms. George is not an enrolled member of the Coeur d’Alene Tribe, but is a child,
grandchild, or great-grandchild of a Coeur d’Alene Tribal Member with reference
to Ms. George’s biological mother, Jean Marie Moffitt.
Ms. George’s biological father’s ancestry is unknown.  Ms. George’s Family
Ancestry Chart contains no information in her paternal line.  She does not know
her biological father.  Ms. George’s adoptive mother, Alieene George, testified
that there are some errors on Ms. George’s family tree when it goes back into the
Spokane Tribe area.  The Coeur d’Alene Tribe would need to petition the
Spokane Tribe to go back into Ms. George’s biological mother’s heritage two or
three generations to have the corrections made, but based on the evidence
presented at the hearing, what is presently undisputed is that Ms. George has
14/64ths combined Coeur d’Alene, Spokane, and Colville blood, or is nearly 22%
Indian.  Ms. George’s adoptive father, Oswald (“Ozzie”) George, is an enrolled
member of the Coeur d’Alene Tribe.  Ms. George’s adoptive mother is an
enrolled member of the Flathead Tribe.
Ms. George has two children and one on the way.  The children are being enrolled
with the Coeur d’Alene Tribe; the children’s fathers are enrolled tribal members.
It is undisputed that Ms. George is not an enrolled member of the Coeur d’Alene
Tribe.  According to Alieene George, a person must be 25% Coeur d’Alene
Indian to be an enrolled member.  In addition, according to counsel for the State
and Defendant, the Coeur d’Alene Tribe will not prosecute crimes committed on
the reservation by persons who are not enrolled members of the Tribe.
Ms. George was born in a hospital in Spokane, but has lived on the Coeur d’Alene
Reservation for the vast majority of her life.  Ms. George lived in Coeur d’Alene
at St. Vincent’s transitional housing for a couple of months three years ago.  Other
than  that,  she  testified  that  she  has  lived  on  the  Coeur  d’Alene  Reservation.
Ms. George has received medical, housing, food, educational, and other benefits
from  the  Coeur  d’Alene  Tribe.   Ms.  George  has  received  [  ]  [  ]  these  [various]
benefits from the time she was born and Alieene George testified that these
benefits will be extended to Ms. George for the duration of her life.  Alieene
George testified that Ms. George qualifies for the benefits even though she is not
an enrolled Coeur d’Alene tribal member because she is a descendent of a tribal
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member.  Ms. George and her mother testified that Ms. George has throughout her
life taken part in tribal sponsored events and activities such as the Tribe’s taking
tribal members to Silverwood, concerts, boxing matches, state games, and cultural
events such as the Julyamsh powwows (although Ms. George explained that the
Coeur d’Alene Tribe lost its unique culture to the Jesuits in the 1800s and that the
annual Julyamsh event is not a true powwow).
Ms. George is qualified to be an adopted enrolled Tribal member because her
father is an enrolled member of the Coeur d’Alene Tribe.  Alieene George further
testified that when the Coeur d’Alene Casino was built in the early 1990s, the
Tribe put a moratorium on tribal adoptions to limit the number of people who
would qualify for royalties from Coeur d’Alene Casino profits.  Apparently many
tribal members who were enrolled in different tribes “decided to jump ship and
transfer from one tribe into the Coeur d’Alene Tribes.  So they closed the
adoption enrollment.”  Alieene George testified that the only tribal benefit
Ms. George does not receive is royalties from Coeur d’Alene Casino profits.
The Court is aware from other cases involving Ms. George in which jurisdiction is
not an issue that she has been employed at the Benewah Market, a grocery store
located on the reservation, and that she received substance abuse treatment from
Benewah Medical & Wellness Center, the Tribe’s health care provider/facility.
(R., pp.103-105.3)
The court ruled that it did not have jurisdiction over Ms. George in a thorough and
comprehensive thirty-page memorandum.  (R., pp.101-131.)  The district court recited the
history of state jurisdiction over crimes committed by Indians in Indian county, noting that “[t]he
Coeur d’Alene Tribe has a fully functioning Tribal Court system and exercises criminal
authority.”  (R., pp.106-107.)  The district court analyzed State v. Ambro, 142 Idaho 77 (Ct. App.
2005), which held that the Coeur d’Alene Tribal Code addressed controlled substances and
“clearly exercised its right to self-government in the area of controlled substances.”  (R., pp.111-
112.)
The district court noted that the parties agreed that Ms. George’s status as an Indian is
key to its decision, and analyzed who is an Indian for purposes of jurisdiction using cases such
3 The district court’s citations to the record have not been reproduced for the reader’s ease.
5
as: United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. 567 (1846), Ex parte Pero, 99 F.2d 28 (7th Cir. 1938),
United States v. Broncheau, 597 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1978), State v. Bonaparte, 114 Idaho 577
(Ct. App. 1988), and Lewis v. State, 137 Idaho 882 (Ct. App. 2002), to determine whether
Ms. George was an Indian.  (R., pp.113-116.)  The Rogers test utilized to determine who in an
“Indian” for purposes of federal jurisdiction requires:  (1) the person have a significant
percentage of Indian blood, and (2) the person be recognized as an Indian either by the federal
government or by some tribe or society of Indians.  (R., p.117, quoting Lewis, 137 Idaho at 885.)
The district court found the State’s contention that “Indian tribes typically require that a person
have at least 25% Indian blood to satisfy the first prong” was flawed.  (R., p.120.)  The court
concluded that, based on the applicable case law which does not require a particular quantum of
Indian blood for prong one purposes, Ms. George was an Indian.  (R., p.125.)
The district court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction (R., pp.134-135), and the
State appealed (R., pp.136-171).
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ISSUE




The District Court Correctly Granted Ms. George’s Motion To Dismiss For Lack Of Subject
Matter Jurisdiction
A. Introduction
A tribal police officer arrested Ms. George for possession of methamphetamine during a
probation search at her home on the Coeur d’Alene Reservation.  After the charges were re-filed
in Idaho state court, Ms. George moved the district court to dismiss her case because Ms. George
is an Indian and the alleged offense occurred on tribal lands.  After a hearing, the district court
found Ms. George was an Indian and dismissed the charges against her for lack of jurisdiction.
This Court should affirm the order granting Ms. George’s motion to dismiss.
B. Standard Of Review
This Court reviews a trial court’s findings of fact for whether these findings are clearly
erroneous. See, e.g., Steiner v. Gilbert, 144 Idaho 240, 243 (2007).  A factual finding is clearly
erroneous if it is not supported by substantial and competent evidence. Id.  “Substantial and
competent evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to support a
conclusion.” Fearn v. Steed, 151 Idaho 295, 298 (2011).
The State has the burden of proof in determining jurisdiction of an accused. State v.
Ambro, 142 Idaho 77, 79 (Ct. App. 2005).  Issues involving jurisdiction are issues of law over
which the appellate court has free review. Id.
C. The  District  Court  Correctly  Dismissed  Ms.  George’s  Case  Due  To  Lack  Of  Subject
Matter Jurisdiction And The State’s Reliance On Bonaparte Is Misplaced
The State has not challenged any of the district court’s factual findings in this appeal.  As
such, the question for this Court is whether, in light of the facts found by the district court, the
district court erred in granting Ms. George’s motion to dismiss.  Ms. George submits that the
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district court’s ruling granting her motion to dismiss was amply supported both by the evidence
and by governing case law, and that this Court should therefore affirm the district court.
The State encourages the court to look no further than State v. Bonaparte to determine
Ms. George’s Indian status,  stating that the facts in Bonaparte are “indistinguishable” from the
facts  Ms.  George  brings  forward.   (Appellant’s  Brief,  p.4.)   The  State  ignores  the  plethora  of
controlling  case  law  in  order  to  arrive  at  the  erroneous  conclusion  that  Ms.  George’s  Indian
status is dependent only on her enrollment or lack thereof.  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.6-7.)  The State
fails to address or even acknowledge the four additional factors identified in the second prong of
the Rogers’ test.  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.6-7.)  Such an argument ignores controlling Idaho Court
of Appeals case law, namely its decision in Lewis v. State, 137 Idaho 882 (Ct. App. 2002).
In Lewis, the Idaho Court of Appeals found that there are factors in addition to tribal
enrollment when deciding whether a defendant is Indian. Id.  at  885.  Specifically,  courts have
looked into “governmental recognition formally and informally through receipt of assistance
reserved only to Indians, enjoyment of benefits of tribal affiliation, and social recognition as an
Indian through residence on a reservation and participation in Indian social life.” Id.  The Court
of Appeals in Lewis stated that even though Bonaparte only looked at whether the defendant was
an enrolled member of a tribe, enrollment was not an absolute requirement. Id.  Essentially, the
Lewis court qualified the Court’s 1988 decision in Bonaparte, by acknowledging that, while
tribal enrollment is the most important indicium of recognition as an Indian, it is not an absolute
requirement. Id.   Thus, the district court in this case properly considered binding Idaho Court of
Appeals precedent when it relied on the more recent Lewis decision instead of Bonaparte.
The Supreme Court of the United States has explained “enrollment in an official tribe has
not been held to be an absolute requirement for federal jurisdiction, at least where the Indian
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defendant lived on the reservation and ‘maintained tribal relations with the Indians thereon.’”
United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 646 n.7 (1977) (quoting Ex parte Pero, 99 F.2d 28, 30
(7th Circ. 1938).  As the Ninth Circuit explained in United States v. Broncheau, “[e]nrollment is
the common evidentiary means of establishing Indian status, but it is not the only means nor is it
necessarily determinative.” Broncheau, 597 F.2d at 1263.
The  court  in St. Cloud, found that the defendant was an Indian even though he lacked
enrollment in an active tribe because of his connection with a terminated Indian tribe. St.
Cloud v. United States, 702 F. Supp 1456, 1461-62 (D.S.D. 1988).  Although the defendant did
not receive benefits reserved to Indians under a federal trust, he did receive treatment at a
hospital  under  the  federal  Indian  Health  Services  program,  he  benefitted  from  tribal  programs
including an employment program and an alcohol treatment and counseling program, he lived on
the reservation in federal housing, he participated in tribal social events, and he identified
himself as an Indian. Id. at 1462.
There are many examples of cases in which defendants who were not enrolled in an
Indian tribe were recognized as Indian under the Roger’s two-prong test. See generally, United
States v. Stymiest, 581 F.3d 759 (8th Cir. 2009) (holding defendant was an Indian as, among
other things, he lived and worked on the reservation, submitted to tribal arrests, and held himself
out as an Indian); United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding that defendant
produced enough evidence to establish she was an Indian, even though she was not enrolled in a
tribe because she participated in tribal rituals, was born and lived on an Indian reservation, her
children were both enrolled members, she was treated at a tribal health and treatment center, and
she had been arrested by tribal police in the past); c.f., United States v. Cruz, 554 F.3d 840 (9th
Cir. 2009) (holding defendant was not an Indian because not only was he not enrolled, but he did
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not use any tribal services designated to him through his heritage, and did not participate in any
religious ceremonies); State v. LaPier, 790 P.2d 983 (Mont. 1990) (finding that even though
defendant enjoyed some benefits from affiliation with the tribe, he lived most of his life off tribal
lands and was integrated into non-Indian society, therefore he was not a federally recognized
Indian).
Ms. George’s jurisdictional claim in this case involves the interplay of state and federal
law with regard to certain criminal charges that occur within Indian country and that involve
Indians in the commission of the offense:
Criminal jurisdiction over Indians is divided among federal, state, and tribal
governments.   A  determination  of  whether  one  or  more  of  these  sovereigns
possesses criminal jurisdiction in a particular instance depends upon the type of
offense committed, where the offense was committed, and whether either the
perpetrator or the victim is an Indian.
State v. Mathews, 133 Idaho 300, 310 (1999).
The federal government, and Congress in particular, possesses plenary authority over
Indian affairs, and this authority extends to crimes occurring on tribal lands. Id. at 311.  “As a
corollary to federal sovereignty it is clear that state law has no force and effect, except as granted
by federal law, within the territory of an Indian tribe in matters affecting Indians.” Boyer v.
Shoshone-Bannock Indian Tribes, 92 Idaho 257, 260 (1968).  “States have no jurisdiction over
Indians in Indian country absent the clear consent of Congress.” State v. Major, 111 Idaho 410,
416 (1986).  Additionally, the Idaho State Constitution “expressly recognizes that the Indian
lands within the boundaries of the state ‘shall remain under the absolute jurisdiction and control
of the congress of the United States.’” State v. Allen, 100 Idaho 918, 922 (1980); IDAHO CONST.
Art. 21, § 19.  In light of this, the State bears the burden to establish jurisdiction over an Indian in
Indian country, or to establish that the tribe has consented to the State’s jurisdiction.  Major, 111
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Idaho at 418.  Additionally, this Court narrowly construes any statute purporting to extend state
jurisdiction over Indian country. State v. Barros, 131 Idaho 379, 382 (1998); State v. Ambro,
142 Idaho 77, 81 (Ct. App. 2005).
In the exercise of its plenary authority over Indian affairs, Congress enacted two primary
provisions regarding subject matter jurisdiction over crimes occurring within Indian country. Id.
First, Congress enacted the General Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152,4 which extends federal
jurisdiction and the application of federal criminal law over crimes committed by non-Indians
against Indians in Indian country.  18 U.S.C. § 1152; United States v. LaBuff, 658 F.3d 873, 877
(9th Cir. 2011); Mathews, 133 Idaho at 311.  The second provision enacted by Congress
regarding the commission of criminal offenses within Indian country is the Major Crimes Act,
which provides exclusive federal jurisdiction over certain enumerated offenses when those
crimes are committed by an Indian within Indian country.  18 U.S.C. § 1153; LaBuff, 658 F.3d at
877; Mathews, 133 Idaho at 311.
For those offenses not governed by the Major Crimes Act, Congress further enacted
Public Law 280, which permitted the states to exercise concurrent jurisdiction over Indian affairs
through legislative action. Mathews, 133 Idaho at 311.  Pursuant to this law, the State of Idaho
enacted I.C. § 67-5101, which set out certain areas upon which the State assumed and accepted
jurisdiction for both civil and criminal enforcement of state law.  I.C. § 67-5101; Mathews, 133
Idaho at 311.  As was noted by the Idaho Supreme Court in Mathews, the State of Idaho did not
4 This statutory provision provides in pertinent part that, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law,
the general laws of the United States as to the punishment of offenses committed in any place
within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, except the District of Columbia,
shall extend to Indian country.” See 18 U.S.C. § 1152.
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assume jurisdiction over the offense of murder within I.C. § 67-5101. Mathews, 133 Idaho at
311.
Public Law 280 was subsequently replaced by 25 U.S.C. § 1321, which permitted the
states to assume additional jurisdiction over criminal matters occurring within Indian country
that are committed by or against Indians, but only with the consent of the particular Indian tribe
occupying that territory.  25 U.S.C. § 1321; Mathews, 133 Idaho at 311.  Similarly, Idaho
adopted I.C. § 67-5102, which likewise required tribal consent for the assumption of additional
state jurisdiction for criminal or civil causes of action arising out of Indian country.  I.C. § 67-
5102; Mathews, 133 Idaho at 311; Major,  111  Idaho  at  417.   Accordingly,  while  the  State  of
Idaho may assume additional jurisdiction over offenses that would otherwise be within the
jurisdiction of the federal court under the General Crimes Act, it can only do so through a
resolution adopted by the tribal governing body in which the tribe consents to that jurisdiction.
I.C. § 67-5101.
As to whether the alleged offense in this case occurred within Indian country for purposes
of federal jurisdiction, there appears to be no material dispute on this issue.  (See Appellant’s
Brief, p.1.)  The Coeur d’Alene Reservation has already been deemed by the Idaho Supreme
Court to be “Indian country” for purposes of determining whether the state or federal court has
jurisdiction over a charged offense pursuant to both the General Crimes Act and the Major
Crimes Act. See State v. Ambro, 142 Idaho 77, 89 n.1 (Ct. App. 2005); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1502, 1503;
see also 18 U.S.C. § 1151.  Accordingly, the record reflects that Ms. George’s charged offense
was one that occurred within Indian country, and was an offense for which the Coeur d’Alene
tribe had not consented to Idaho State jurisdiction. See Ambro, 142 Idaho at 83 (holding that the
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Coeur d’Alene Tribal Code addressed controlled substances and “clearly exercised its right to
self-government in the area of controlled substances.”)
Thus, the only issue before the district court was whether Ms. George is an Indian under
federal law. Whether there was subject matter jurisdiction in Idaho state court for the charges
against Ms. George turns upon whether she qualifies as an “Indian,” as that term is used in the
General  Crimes  Act.   Neither  the  General  Crimes  Act,  nor  the  Major  Crimes  Act,  defines  the
term “Indian” as used in these statutes. LaBuff, 658 F.3d at 877.  However, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals has developed a two-part test for determining whether either the victim or the
defendant qualifies as an “Indian” for purposes of these statutes that is instructive for this Court.
First, the individual in question must possess a “sufficient ‘degree of Indian blood.’” LaBuff,
658 F.3d at 877 (quoting United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1223-1224 (9th Cir. 2005)).
Second, that individual must also have “tribal or federal government recognition as an Indian.”
Id.
The requirement that the individual possess a sufficient degree of “Indian blood” does not
require a showing that the person in question has a majority Native American ethnic heritage.  In
fact, federal courts have found that this requirement is met by evidence that the person had 1/8 or
5/32 Indian blood. LaBuff, 658 F.3d at 877; United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1223-1226
(9th Cir. 2005).
The second prong—the question of whether there is governmental or tribal recognition of
the individual’s status as an Indian—is more factually intensive.  There are four general factors
that have been employed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in resolving this question,
although these factors are non-exclusive. LaBuff, 658 F.3d at 877.  In declining order of
importance, these factors are:  (1) whether the individual has enrolled as a tribal member; (2)
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government recognition, either formally or informally, through receipt of assistance reserved
only to Indians; (3) enjoyment of the benefits of tribal affiliation; and (4) social recognition as an
Indian through residence on a reservation and participation in Indian social life. Id.; see also
Lewis v. State, 137 Idaho 882, 885 (Ct. App. 2002).
1. Ms. George Possesses “A Sufficient Degree Of Indian Blood”
The  state  concedes  that  Ms.  George  has  Indian  ancestry  (Appellant’s  Brief,  p.6.)   The
evidence shows, and the district court found, that Ms. George had at least 14/64ths Indian blood.
(R., p.103.)  The district court found that 14/64ths is a significant or substantial amount of Indian
blood.   (R.,  p.125.)   The  State  has  taken  the  position  that,  unless  Ms.  George  is  enrolled  as  a
tribal member, she cannot establish that she has Indian status and, thus, that she falls under tribal
jurisdiction.  (Appellant’s Brief, p.6.)  The State relies on the Idaho Court of Appeals decision in
Bonaparte to support its contention; however, the State’s reliance is misplaced.
In analyzing whether Ms. George has a sufficient degree of Indian blood under prong one
of the test, the district court found the analysis in Bonaparte to be “short-sighted,” noting that
“while enrollment is an important consideration, it is not dispositive.”  (R., p.127.)  In
concluding such, the court relied on the Ninth Circuit’s analysis in United States v. Bruce, 394
F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 2005).  (R., pp.127-128.)
To the extent the language of Bonaparte may be an aberration in that it is inconsistent
with precedent and cases decided thereafter, it is also distinguishable in that, in addition to the
lack of enrollment, the Court of Appeals found “no other substantial indicia of federal
recognition of Bonaparte’s Indian status,” presumably because Bonaparte had absolutely no
connection to the tribe at all; thus, the Court implied it was unnecessary to further examine the
recognition prong. Bonaparte, 114 Idaho at 580.  In its memorandum decision, the district court
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accurately pointed out the flaws in the Bonaparte decision, but relied on the decision in Lewis, a
more recent (and more well-reasoned) Court of Appeals case.  (R., pp.117-130.)
There are multiple factors to be reviewed to determine whether a person is recognized as
an Indian.  While tribal enrollment may be the most important indicium of recognition, it
certainly is not the sole indicium, and the analysis certainly does not just end when the person in
question is not enrolled in the tribe. See Lewis, 137 Idaho 882, 885 (Ct. App. 2002); Broncheau,
597 F.2d 1262-63 (finding that enrollment could be an absolute requirement, but is not the only
means of requirement for determining Indian status); United States v. Bruce, 394 F. 3d 1215,
1224 (9th Cir. 2005) (discussing evidence that courts have used to determine tribal or federal
government recognition of Indian status).
The first prong is not conditioned on whether the defendant has enough blood to enroll in
a specific tribe, but whether the defendant has enough to meet the requisite “degree” of Indian
blood. See St. Cloud v. United States, 702 F. Supp. 1456, 1460 (D.S.D. 1988) (holding that the
defendant’s 15/32 of Indian blood was “sufficient to satisfy the first requirement of having a
degree of Indian blood.”)  Although there is no set percentage of blood a defendant must have,
some Courts have stated that under twenty-five percent Indian blood is enough to satisfy the
first-prong while others have stated that just having an identified Indian parent, grandparent or
great-grandparent is enough.  In United States v. Cruz, the Ninth Circuit held that a defendant
with twenty-two percent American Indian blood met the first prong. United States v. Cruz, 554
F.3d 840, 846 (9th Cir. 2009).  In Goforth v. State, the Oklahoma Court of Appeals found that an
appellant with “slightly less than one-quarter” Indian blood was enough to satisfy the first prong
of the two-prong test. Goforth v. State, 644 P. 2d 114, 116 (Okla. Ct. App. 1982).  In United
States v. Bruce, the Ninth Circuit court explained that the first prong requires “ancestry living in
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America before the Europeans arrived” and that “evidence of a parent, grandparent, or great-
grandparent who is clearly identified as an Indian is generally sufficient to satisfy this prong.”
Bruce, 394 F. 3d 1215, 1223 (9th Cir. 2005).  Courts in numerous jurisdictions have held that
just under a quarter of Indian blood is enough to satisfy this prong.
The Bruce Court used the same analysis as the Idaho Court of Appeals did in Lewis.  In
Lewis v. State, the Court held that the defendant was not an Indian because the only evidence that
the  defendant  brought  forward  regarding  his  ties  to  an  Indian  tribe  was  that  he  lived  on  a
reservation until he was five or six, he inherited an interest in some land on the reservation, his
brother and sister were enrolled members, and he attended an Indian festival as a child. Lewis,
137 Idaho at 885.  The Court stated that these minor associations with the tribe were not enough
to outweigh the evidence that after leaving the reservation, the defendant never attempted to
enroll in the tribe, never participated in tribal activities save the one from his childhood, never
sought federal assistance for being an Indian and was never affiliated with Indian religions. Id.
2. Ms. George Is Recognized As An Indian By The Coeur d’Alene Tribe
The second prong, frequently referred to as the recognition prong, requires recognition as
an Indian by a Tribe or the Federal Government. Lewis v. State, 137 Idaho 882, 885 (Ct. App.
2002).  The second-prong “probes whether the Native American has a sufficient non-racial link
to a formerly sovereign people.” Bruce, 394 F.3d at 1224 (quoting St. Cloud, 702 F. Supp. at
1461).  The second-prong is comprised of four factors:  1) tribal enrollment; 2) governmental
recognition formally and informally through receipt of assistance reserved only to Indians; 3)
enjoyment of benefits  of tribal  affiliation; and 4) social  recognition as an Indian through living
on a reservation and participating in Indian social life. Id.  If the individual is not enrolled in a
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tribe, courts look at these factors separately and then weigh them to decide whether the defendant
is recognized as an Indian. See Id and see generally Lewis, 137 Idaho at 885.
i.   Ms. George Is Not An Enrolled Member Of The Coeur d’Alene Tribe
As to the first, and most significant, consideration, the district court found that
Ms. George was not an enrolled member of the Coeur d’Alene Tribe.  (R., p.103.)  However, that
fact is not determinative on whether she is an Indian under federal jurisdiction.
The State relies almost exclusively on State v. Bonaparte, stating that the facts in
Bonaparte are “indistinguishable” from the facts Ms. George brings forward (Appellant’s Brief,
p.4); however, the State virtually ignores controlling case law such as Lewis v. State, 137 Idaho
882 (Ct. App. 2002) (examining the enrollment as just one of the four factors in the second prong
of the analysis).  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.6-7.)  Ultimately, Ms. George’s Indian status is not solely
dependent on her enrollment or lack thereof, as discussed in Section C, pages 8-10, of this
Respondent’s Brief.
ii.    Ms. George Receives Assistance Reserved For Indians
The second consideration of whether there was government recognition of a person’s
status as an Indian in light of assistance reserved for Indians, was met in light of the record in
this case.  Among the exhibits provided to the district court was evidence that Ms. George had
been receiving medical treatment at Benewah Medical Center.  (R., p.83.)  The district court
found Ms. George received medical benefits from the Coeur d’Alene Tribe.  (R., p.104.)
The Ninth Circuit in LaBuff has held that the receipt of medical services intended for
tribal members and other non-member Indians is sufficient to establish the second and third
factors regarding recognized status as a tribal member. LaBuff, 658 F.3d at 878.  Accordingly,
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Ms. George asserts that evidence such as her receipt of medical services through the Benewah
Medical Center demonstrates government recognition of her status as an Indian through the
receipt of services reserved for Indians and that she received benefits as a result of her tribal
affiliation.
iii.   Ms. George Receives Benefits Of Tribal Affiliation
The third consideration of whether there was government recognition of a person’s status
as an Indian in light of tribal affiliation, also appears to be met in light of the record in this case.
The district court found that Ms. George has, throughout her life, participated in tribal sponsored
events and activities such as a trip for tribal members to Silverwood, concerts, boxing matches,
state games and other cultural events.  (R., p.104.)
iv. Ms. George Is Socially Recognized As An Indian Where She Has Resided
On A Reservation For Nearly Her Entire Life And Participates In Indian
Social Life
The last of the non-exclusive factors employed by the Ninth Circuit is whether there is
evidence of social recognition as an Indian through residence on a reservation and participation
in Indian social life. LaBuff, 658 F.3d at 877.  The district court found Ms. George has resided
on the reservation nearly her entire life.  (R., p.129.)  The court found that the Tribe recognizes
her as an Indian and she has received benefits from the Tribe or through the Tribe reserved for
Indians including:  health care, substance abuse treatment, housing assistance, job assistance,
education, social benefits (such as trips to Silverwood), and food assistance.  (R., p.130.)
Ms. George has lived and worked on the reservation and participated in Tribal social and cultural
events throughout her life.  (R., p.130.)
19
   In addition to living as an Indian her entire life, the record indicates that Ms. George was
initially arrested by the Coeur d’Alene Tribal police because the police officer believed
Ms. George was a member of the Coeur d’Alene Tribe.  (R., p.8.)
v. The District Court Properly Held Ms. George Is Recognized As An Indian
Where She Meets Three Of The Four Factors
The evidence contained within the record demonstrates that Ms. George is an Indian for
purposes of determining subject matter jurisdiction under the General Crimes Act.  Because
Ms.  George  in  an  Indian,  her  offense  occurred  within  Indian  country,  and  was  an  offense  for
which the Coeur d’Alene tribe had not provided for Idaho state jurisdiction, there was no subject
matter jurisdiction for her possession charge and conviction within Idaho courts.  Following the
Idaho Court of Appeals’ decision in Lewis, as well as applicable Ninth Circuit decisions, the
district court correctly found that Ms. George met both prongs of the Rogers test and therefore it
did not have jurisdiction over the case.  Accordingly, Ms. George asks that this Court affirm the
district court’s order granting her motion to dismiss.
CONCLUSION
Ms. George respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s Order Granting
her Motion to Dismiss.
DATED this 12th day of January, 2018.
___________/s/______________
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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